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This paper analyses the European budget and the net position of the ten new member states. We 
argue that the EU budget should be reconsidered, as the Union has expanded to 25 member 
states and has become more heterogeneous. We demonstrate how the ten new members fared 
with respect to the budgetary plans outlined in the budget proposal approved at the 2002 summit 
at Copenhagen. We show that, in 2004, the new member states failed to qualify for the whole 
planned budget within the agricultural policy and the structural funds. On the other hand, they 
qualified for more than planned from a set of internal policy programmes and also from 
compensation transfers. We discuss the financial outlook for 2007–2013 and its recent 
developments. We argue that for the EU budget to support economic growth, the priorities must 
be re-oriented towards potentially productive spending programmes, and spending on old-
fashioned programmes, such as the Common Agricultural Policy, should be scaled down or 
possibly re-nationalised. We show, however, that it is exactly these programmes that remained 
unchanged in the final negotiations for the 2007–2013 perspective. A simple economic growth 
model illustrates that the current EU budget setting is, at best, neutral with respect to the EU-
wide long-term growth potential and may actually hamper growth in the majority of the EU 
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Nontechnical Summary 
The European Union finds itself in a fascinating period. The great push for more integration and 
enlargement in the 1990s has led to some fatigue within the EU. At the same time, the EU is 
underperforming in economic terms not only against the USA, but more importantly against the 
expectations of its own citizens. As a reaction, the EU has set out to streamline its governance and 
re-focus towards growth-friendly activities.  
The Union’s financial framework for the 2007–2013 period reflects these conflicts. In June 2005, 
the EU summit failed to approve the framework proposed by the European Commission. After 
frantic negotiations and concessions from Germany, Britain and the new member states, the 
outlook was approved in December 2005 and a review of the budget was promised in 2008–2009.  
The European Union budget is tiny – about 1% of the Union’s GNI – compared to national public 
budgets, which typically consume more than 40% of the country’s GNI. Still, even this small 
budget is a legitimate concern for policy makers and analysts, as it represents about €120–150bn 
annually, and for poorer countries transfers from the budget may reach as much as 4% of their 
GDP, i.e. significant amount, especially given their frail budgetary position. At the same time, the 
EU is grappling with its ambitious “Lisbon agenda”, which was launched in 2000 with the goal of 
creating “the most competitive economy” by 2010. Although the project is in doubt, the EU’s 
budget for 2007–2013 is expected to accommodate some aspects of the Lisbon agenda. These two 
developments put the two largest EU budgetary programmes in the spotlight: the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Structural Funds (SF), which together consume 80% of the EU 
budget. To complicate matters further, the United Kingdom’s rebate, applied since 1984, has 
come under attack, with some countries arguing for it to be replaced by a more general 
compensation scheme.  
This paper discusses the EU budget’s outlook and analyses its efficiency in achieving the goals set 
by national and Union authorities. We also show that the new members were unable to qualify for 
all the allocated funds, especially in agriculture and the structural funds. We illustrate how the 
perspective was changed in late 2005 to accommodate member states’ concerns and we show that 
the subsequent cuts were disproportionately concentrated in structural operations while 
agricultural subsidies were left largely intact. 
Using a simple growth model, we find that, once the distortionary nature of taxation is taken into 
account, the EU budget increases growth in ten EU-25 member countries and has an insignificant 
or mildly negative impact on the remaining fifteen. If we take the EU-25 as a single entity, the EU 
budget most probably has a negligible effect. The new member states are, however, more likely to 
get a positive stimulus from investment in physical and human capital. We thus suggest a re-
shaping of the EU budget to reflect the new set-up of the Union, which now consists of 25 widely 
income-different countries. In accordance with other analyses, we argue that the enlarged Union 
cannot continue to support the excessively expensive agricultural policy, which brings no tangible 
economic benefits. We argue that the 2004–2006 co-financing of EU budget transfers to farmers 
in the new member states represents a first attempt at introducing a national co-financing 
mechanism into the CAP and should be extended.  The EU Budget Dispute – A Blessing in Disguise?   3 
 
On the other hand, the EU may play useful role in financing some areas with potential economies 
of scale or high public good or externality effects. These may include research and development 
(including international training and education, where Erasmus is planned to take 40% of the 
education budget, i.e. €14bn) and infrastructure programmes.  
The new member states may play a useful role in the EU budget negotiations if they help to bring 
about a substantial change in the budget. The EU budget as it is now represents a neutral factor for 
most countries and it will accelerate the new member states’ economies only marginally. Given 
the attention, effort and time given to the budget, it is not good value for their money. 
1. Introduction  
The European Union went through a difficult time in 2005. First, voters in France and the 
Netherlands rejected the Constitutional Treaty, throwing the institutional architecture of the EU 
into doubt. Then, in June 2005, the EU summit failed to approve the new budget outlook for 
2007–2013 proposed by the European Commission. After frantic negotiations and concessions 
from Germany, Britain and the new member states the outlook was approved in December 2005 
and a review of the budget was promised in 2008–2009.  
The European Union budget is tiny – about 1% of the Union’s GNI – compared to national public 
budgets, which typically consume more than 40% of the country’s GNI. Still, even this small 
budget is a legitimate concern for policy makers and analysts, as it represents about €120–150bn 
annually, and for poorer countries transfers from the budget may reach as much as 4% of their 
GDP, i.e. significant amount, especially given their frail budgetary position.
1  
The budgetary discussion has been difficult, which is not that surprising given the long list of 
contentious issues that emerged during the preliminary discussions. The European Union has to 
accommodate ten new member countries that joined the EU in 2004 and has to prepare for two 
more entrants – Bulgaria and Romania – that are expected to enter the EU in 2007. As all these 
countries tend to be poorer than the existing members (with few exceptions) and tend to have 
larger agricultural sectors, the new EU make-up thus has serious budgetary consequences. At the 
same time, the EU is grappling with its ambitious “Lisbon agenda”, which was launched in 2000 
with the goal of creating “the most competitive economy” by 2010. Although the project is in 
doubt, the EU’s budget for 2007–2013 is expected to accommodate some aspects of the Lisbon 
agenda. These two developments put two largest EU budgetary programmes in the spotlight: the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the Structural Funds (SF), which together consume 80% 
of the EU budget. To complicate matters further, the United Kingdom’s rebate, applied since 
1984, has come under attack, with some countries arguing for it to be replaced by a more general 
compensation scheme.  
However, the EU budget is subject to inter-governmental negotiations, and often bargains, so it is 
more a reflection of political preferences and historical compromises than a welfare-maximising 
instrument. But the enlargement of the EU and the aforementioned factors have made this 
budgetary round much more fragile and potentially volatile. There are more numerous and more 
heterogeneous players in the game and equilibrium is harder to find. Indeed, as the collapse of the 
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EU constitution in May 2005, when France and the Netherlands failed to approve the document in 
a referendum, illustrates, the EU is at a crossroads. The “ever closer Union” principle embedded 
in the original EU project is under threat and a reverse motion is a real possibility for the first time 
in the EU’s history. In this context, the EU budget gains greater importance than its financial 
whereabouts would suggest. It is a battlefield for the future of the EU, so its fate is of crucial 
importance, not least for the new member states that have just joined the Union. 
In this paper, we aim to provide a comprehensive discussion of the EU budget’s outlook and an 
analysis of its efficiency in achieving the goals set by national and Union authorities. The paper is 
organised as follows. After this introduction, we discuss the EU budget for the period 2000–2006, 
with a special focus on the 2004 enlargement in the second chapter. In the third chapter, we 
analyse the budgetary data from 2004 – the first year in which the new member states contributed 
to the budget and drew resources from it. We show that the new members were unable to qualify 
for all the allocated funds, especially in agriculture and the structural funds. 
The fourth chapter is devoted to the EU’s budgetary proposal for the 2007–2013 financial 
framework. We analyse to what extent the proposed reshuffling of the EU budgetary priorities 
reflects economic reasons and to what extent it may be supportive of the Lisbon agenda goals. We 
also briefly discuss the European Commission’s proposals to reform the British rebate instituted 
in the 1980s. We illustrate how the perspective was changed in late 2005 to accommodate 
member states’ concerns and we show that the subsequent cuts were disproportionately 
concentrated in structural operations while agricultural subsidies were left largely intact. 
The fifth chapter employs a simple growth model to determine the likely effects of the EU budget 
on the economic growth and performance of the EU member states. We find that, once the 
distortionary nature of taxation is taken into account, the EU budget increases growth in ten EU-
25 member countries and has an insignificant or mildly negative impact on the remaining fifteen. 
If we take the EU-25 as a single entity, the EU budget most probably has a negligible effect. The 
new member states are, however, more likely to get a positive stimulus from investment in 
physical and human capital.  
The sixth chapter is devoted to a brief analysis of the new financial framework’s impact on new 
member states’ budgets and we find that the new framework for 2007–2013 maintains their 
inferior position vis-à-vis the old member countries. We also suggest a re-shaping of the EU 
budget to reflect the new set-up of the Union, which now consists of 25 widely income-different 
countries. In accordance with other analyses, we argue that the enlarged Union cannot continue to 
support the excessively expensive agricultural policy, which brings no tangible economic benefits. 
Also, slashing agricultural expenditure would allow the EU budget to concentrate on programmes 
with Union-wide effects. The last chapter concludes the paper and offers some tentative 
recommendations. 
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2. Financial Perspective for 2000–2006 
The European Budget has been a contentious issue for the member states since its conception in 
1952 (as a small budget of the European Coal and Steel Community, as it was then). Regardless 
of the EU’s cherished community spirit, most countries have treated the budget as a battle for 
funds among countries. The main preoccupation of many was to “get my money back”, as 
succinctly put by the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1978. The result is not a budget 
concentrated on programmes better executed at Union level, but rather a hotchpotch of 
programmes structured so as to compensate countries that dislike or fear certain EU policies. 
Thus, the budget reflects more historical than economical forces and, from this perspective, could 
be considered a “historical relic”.
2 In this chapter, we will discuss the main pillars of the EU 
budget and their efficiency. 
Table 1: EU-25 Financial Perspective 2000–2006 (current prices, EUR millions)  
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 Current  prices 2004  prices 
1. Agriculture 
  1a CAP 
  1b Rural development 
2. Structural actions 
  2a Structural funds 
  2b Cohesion funds 
3. Internal policies 
4. External actions 
5. Administration 
6. Reserves 
7. Pre-accession aid 
  7a Agriculture 
  7b Structural instrument 











































































































Total appropriations for 
commitments 
93.792  97.189 100.672 102.145 115.434 117.526 118.967 
Total appropriations for 
payments 
91.332  94.730 100.078 102.767 111.380 112.260 114.740 
Ceiling for appropriations 
for payments 































Source: European Commission (2004a). 
 
Common Agricultural Policy 
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) accounted for 44% of the EU’s budget in 2004, while the 
agricultural sector created less than 4% of EU-25 GDP. The CAP was established by the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957, where its basic objectives were outlined. These have hardly changed since. The 
official objectives are to “assure the availability of supplies at reasonable prices for consumers”; 
to “ensure a fair standard of living for farmers”; to “increase agricultural productivity”; and to 
“stabilise agricultural markets”. The more earthy motivation was to compensate France for 
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opening its markets to German (and Belgian and Dutch) industrial firms. The CAP’s lasting status 
is reflected in the fact that it is excluded from discussion in the European Parliament, which is 
supposed to control the EU’s budget. 
The scheme used to consume as much as 60% of the EU budget. In 2004, the CAP accounted for 
€43bn, plus a further €6.5bn was spent on rural development projects, often interconnected with 
the CAP
3 – see Table 1. The biggest recipient of CAP expenditures has traditionally been France, 
accounting for 20–25% of the total.
4 The biggest beneficiary per head, however, is Ireland, which 
receives almost €500 per head, followed by Greece with €250 per head.  
The CAP has been “reformed” many times. The last reform package dates from 2003. The CAP 
has shifted from production support towards direct support to farmers, i.e. income support for a 
specific group. By doing so, the CAP has lost its EU-wide aspects and has developed into just 
another redistributive mechanism. As such it should be delegated back to the national level, as the 
EU is not involved in redistributive policies within countries.  
Moreover, the CAP fails in its official stated goals of delivering goods at “reasonable” prices and 
“stabilising agricultural markets”. Due to high guaranteed prices and trade restrictions, European 
consumers pay more for agriculture than they would in the absence of the CAP. The agricultural 
sector is increasing its productivity, albeit slowly, and farmers enjoy a “reasonable standard of 
living”, but the whole sector is far from stable and the stability it benefits from is compensated by 
constant turmoil in world agricultural markets and tensions between the EU and its trading 
partners, which blame it, correctly, for unfair practices in subsidising its agricultural exports. The 
CAP has succeeded in placating potentially rebellious farmers in several EU member states, but it 
has, at the same time, made the agricultural lobby formidably powerful and determined to 
maintain the status quo. 
A good illustration of the agricultural lobby’s power is the 2003 reform, which actually increased 
the costs of the CAP, as additional payments to milk producers were introduced (at a cost of 
€1.4bn in 2005). Moreover, modified crop payments for rice increased the costs of the CAP by 
€300m in 2005. A few other programmes (“specific quality premium for durum wheat” and 
“payments for nuts” – apparently fruit) increased the costs by a further €640m). Thus, the 
“reform”, which also included some cuts, led to an increase of €1.3bn in the CAP budget.
5 The 
budget increased by 8.3% to €51bn for 2005. Also, the very fact that agricultural subsidies were 
cut the least in the final negotiations on the 2007–2013 perspective show the exclusive position of 
this spending programme in the EU budget – see chapter IV for details. 
It is interesting to note that only €0.65bn (or 1.5%) of the total agriculture budget went to the ten 
new member states in 2004. Interestingly, these countries were “allowed” to top up the EU’s 
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payments to their farmers.
6 This decision in fact represents “re-nationalisation” of agricultural 
policy, but went unnoticed in countries that strongly oppose any cuts in the EU agriculture budget. 
Why, then, couldn’t the CAP be scaled back in the old EU member countries and they be given 
the same “right” to increase subsidies from their national budgets, as the new EU-10 nations do? 
Such re-nationalisation would reveal national preferences for spending on agricultural support. 
While some countries may prefer even higher subsidies than the current CAP provides, others 
may opt for much reduced support. 
The development to date begs the question whether the CAP can be reformed at all. The European 
Council fixed the CAP expenditures for 2007–2013 in autumn 2002, after brisk agreement was 
reached between France and Germany, thus pre-empting any discussion of the CAP within the 
2007–2013 financial framework formal discussions. This rather exceptional decision was 
apparently guided by the two countries’ wish to avoid an agricultural policy discussion in an 
enlarged Union, where some members might have questioned the CAP’s logic. The move 
constitutes a flagrant breach of the budgetary process and should be prevented in future.
7  
Table 2: EU Structural Funds’ Objectives 
ERDF 
- promotion of productivity and creation of new jobs 
- investment in infrastructure 
- local developmental initiatives and assistance for small and medium-sized enterprises 
ESF 
- employment policy and tackling unemployment 
- development of social sphere 
- promotion of lifelong learning and introduction of systems for improvement of human 
resources 
- bridging economic and social differences 
- promotion of equal employment opportunities for men and women 
EAGGF 
- reorganisation of agriculture, including organisation and processing of agricultural, fishery and 
forestry products 
- encouragement of restructuring of agricultural production and development of forestry and 
support for development of subsidiary occupations in rural areas 
- provision of adequate living standard for people in rural areas 
- help for rural areas in their efforts to preserve and improve the environment 
FIFG 
- to contribute to sustainable balance between water resources and their exploitation 
- to increase competitiveness of fisheries sector and development of viable enterprises in this 
sector 
- to improve supply and value-added to fisheries and aquaculture 
- to revitalise areas dependent on fisheries and aquaculture 
Source: Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/99 of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions on the 
Structural Funds.  
 
The 2002 deal, however, may be circumvented by treating the deal as a ceiling, not as spending 
targets, i.e. as the Financial Perspective is always treated. Here, the Constitutional Treaty is 
crucial, as it would scrap the differences between “compulsory spending”, i.e. the CAP, and the 
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rest. Thus, the European Parliament would begin to influence the CAP spending policies and it 
might not feel constrained by the Franco-German deal of 2002.
8 
Structural funds 
The second most important EU budgetary programme is the so-called “structural measures”, 
implemented through four structural funds and the Cohesion Fund. In 2004, these funds accounted 
for 35% of the EU budget. There are four structural funds (the European Regional Development 
Fund – ERDF, the European Social Fund – ESF, the European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund – EAGGF, and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance – FIFG). The 
structural funds’ objectives are shown in Table 2. 
The structural funds are distributed among the EU member states according to three “objectives”: 
Objective 1: Eligible areas are those that have less than 75% of EU average per capita GDP. Such 
areas are eligible for financial aid for improving infrastructure, employment and the development 
of the industrial sector. The Objective 1 regions received 64% of the total budget allocated for the 
structural policy.  
Objective 2: Eligible areas are those with economic and social difficulties, such as restructuring, 
negative economic growth and high unemployment. In 2004, 10% of the structural funding was 
spent on this objective. 
Objective 3: Aimed at the modernisation of education systems and the creation of employment, 
this Objective covers those areas not included in Objective 1. Within Objective 3, 11% of all the 
structural funds were spent in 2004.  
Lastly, the Cohesion Fund, created by the Maastricht Treaty in 1994 and designed for countries 
whose per capita GDP is below 90% of the Community average, spends 14% of the total 
structural budget. The member states qualifying for the money are Spain, Portugal, Ireland and 
Greece
9 as well as all the new EU members. The money is spent on environmental and transport 
network projects.
10 
The biggest recipients of the structural funds and Cohesion Fund are Greece and Portugal with 
spending of €2,200 per head, followed by Spain and Ireland with spending above €1,000 per head. 
The highest contribution measured as a percentage of GDP was received by Portugal in 1993, 
when the structural funds invested 3.5% of GDP in Portugal. The rest of the EU-15 countries 
receive much smaller transfers through the structural funds. The 2004 enlargement, however, 
destabilised the structural funds. 92% of the new member states’ populations live in regions with 
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Parliament’s intervention in the CAP. 
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“statistical regions” below. 
10 During the 2005 British presidency, an idea of a “Globalisation Fund” was floated. The fund was supposed to 
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income below 75% of the EU-25 average.
11 If, as expected, Romania and Bulgaria become EU 
members in 2007, this number will increase further.  
Due to the enlargement, several regions that were eligible for “Objective 1” in the previous 
financial framework have lost this status. This effect would entail 18 regions with 17 million 
inhabitants – all the Eastern German Länder, parts of Wales and Scotland in the UK, and parts of 
Spain, Greece and Portugal.
12 The European Commission suggests creating a new facility for 
these “statistical effect” regions providing them with transitional access to the structural funds. 
Also due to this measure, 52% of the spending would continue to be spent in the EU-15 countries 
during the new financial perspective period 2007–2013. The ten new members would be eligible 
for 42%, the remaining 6% being allocated to Bulgaria and Romania. 
The European Commission suggests expanding the structural funds to so-called “phasing-out” 
regions which lost their eligibility due to the “statistical effect”. Moreover, eligible regions which 
do not fulfil the convergence criteria even without the statistical effects of the enlargement would 
now be classified as “phasing-in” regions. These “phasing-in” regions would be eligible under the 
new arrangement, as the EC wants to transform existing Objective 2 instruments into general 
support for regional development – for details see chapter III. Also, the 2007–2013 budget cuts 
the mandatory co-financing share from 25% to 15% of total costs. 
Figure 1a  Figure 1b 
Source: Inforegio, Regional Policy, European Commission (2006). 
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New Member States 
 
Eight Central and Eastern European countries and two Mediterranean islands became member 
states (NMSs) of the European Union in May 2004. In budgetary terms, their membership was 
accommodated by the Copenhagen European Council in 2002. The NMSs were given total 
commitments of €41bn and they are expected to contribute €15bn to the budget. The most 
contentious issue was the expansion of the CAP to the NMSs, which resulted in the compromise 
described above – see footnote 6.  
Prior to their entry to the EU, there were many estimates as to the budgetary impact of the NMSs’ 
membership. Some studies, most notably Kopits and Szekely (2002) took a very pessimistic view, 
estimating that EU membership would worsen the budgetary balance in the NMSs by as much as 
4.75% of GDP for the Czech Republic, 4% for Estonia and Hungary, and 3% for Poland and 
Slovenia. As noted in Hallet (2004), their estimates were based on the assumption that all co-
financing of the EU structural funds’ spending will be new spending by national governments.  
Hallet (2004) reached less negative results for the Polish budget. He estimated that the fiscal 
balance may worsen by approximately 1% of GDP as a result of EU membership, arguing that a 
substantial part of the EU payments will not benefit the government budget but will go straight to 
the final recipients, often private (farmers) or independent from the government (universities). 
Other estimates were more cautious. Backé (2002) estimated the net effect of EU membership on 
the net fiscal balance “over the medium term” as neutral. Besides being less aggressive on co-
financing, he also assumed lower administration costs and quantified the “positive growth effect” 
of EU membership, which should improve the budgets of the NMSs by 0.5–1.0% of GDP. 
Even more optimistic are Hallet and Keereman (2005) who argue that the NMSs will gain from 
membership, partly due to the negotiated “compensation scheme”, which directs €1–1.4bn to the 
NMSs in the 2004–2006 period. He estimates that the NMSs will gain, on average, 0.9% of GDP 
in 2004, 1.5% of GDP in 2005 and 1.6% of GDP in 2006. The biggest net receiver is Lithuania, 
which may receive 2–2.5% of GDP in net transfers in 2006.
13 Latvia is scheduled to receive a net 
2% of GDP in 2006. The lowest net gains are expected in Cyprus, Slovenia, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic (around 0.5% of their GDPs). These estimates are supported by our analysis of 
the 2004 data – see chapter III. 
The crucial point in Hallet’s analysis is the interpretation of the co-financing requirements and the 
so-called “additionality” of the EU budget payments. Using European Commission documents, 
Hallet argues that additionality requires only limited additional spending from the NMSs’ 
budgets, ranging from 0.1% of GDP for Cyprus to 1% of GDP for Latvia in 2006. The average 
co-financing requirement is only 0.5% of GDP in both 2005 and 2006. These low requirements 
(compared to Kopits and Szekely) are based on the European Commission interpretation that the 
additional requirement relates only to EU funding, not to national co-funding. Thus, the NMSs are 
free to reallocate their spending towards projects not financed by the EU structural funds and this 
reallocation may be at the expense of potentially EU-financed programmes. Given, however, that 
most NMSs already spend more than 3% of their GDP on capital formation that is eligible for 
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structural fund and Cohesion Fund financing, it should be fairly easy for the NMSs to satisfy the 
additionality requirement. 
It should be stressed that these estimates typically do not quantify the benefits that the NMSs and 
their budgets may gain from EU membership. It is fair to expect that membership will have a 
positive sustained impact on growth and employment in the longer run – see chapter IV. This, in 
turn, will be reflected in an endogenous windfall gain in income tax revenue and a decline in 
social transfers. 
Table 3: Budgetary Cash Flows between National Budgets of Member Countries and the EU 
Budget between 2004 and 2006 
EU BUDGET REVENUE  EU BUDGET EXPENDITURE 
  
OWN RESOURCES:  
1. The VAT-based resources 
2. The GNI-based resources 
3. Traditional own resources 
o custom duties 
o antidumping and other product import duties 
from third countries 
o levies on agricultural products import from 
third countries 
o levies on sugar, isoglucose and inuline (sugar 
o levies)     
4. United Kingdom correction (also UK 
rebate) 
 
OTHER REVENUE: proceeds from taxation 
on the salaries, wages and allowances of EU staff, 
interests and repayments, income from fines  
LOANS 
1. Agricultural policy (market related expenditure, 
direct aids, rural development) 
2. Structural and cohesion policy (four structural 
funds: the European Regional Development Fund, the 
European Social Fund, the European Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund, the Financial 
Instrument for Fisheries Guidance; cohesion fund)  
3. Internal policies (e.g. Schengen border in Slovenia) 
4. External actions 
5. Administration 
6. Reserves 
7. Pre-accession aid (for new member states) 
o  SAPARD 
o  ISPA 
o  PHARE 
8. Compensations (cash flow lump-sums, budgetary 
compensations) 
Source: European Commission, Summary of Legislation: Introduction to Budget (2006). 
3. The New Member States and the Budget in 2004  
The first year the new member states spent in the EU – i.e. the incomplete 2004, as they joined the 
EU on 1 May – presents an opportunity to analyse the real impact of the EU budget on these 
countries. For this purpose, we compare “appropriations for payments” as approved at the EU’s 
Copenhagen summit in 2002 with the actual 2004 data as reported in European Commission 
(2005). The Copenhagen framework was itself a restrictive version of the so-called Berlin 
Financial Framework of 1999. The European Union planned in 1999 to spend €12bn on the new 
member states in 2004 and to increase this payment to €14bn in 2005 and eventually to €17bn in 
2006 (all at 1999 prices). These “commitments”, reaching €43bn, were cut by some 4% in 
Copenhagen. The EU planned to spend 60–65% of this money on the structural funds and “only” 
€9.5bn was planned for the agricultural sector.  
However, both the national authorities and EU officials have found it difficult to abide by this 
plan. The available data show the sums that were appropriated in the EU budget for the new 
member states. The actual spending will not be known until the end of 2007, when the transfers 12   Ondřej Schneider  
 
must be cleared and approved by the European Commission. Therefore, the data in the following 
table do not show the final spending, but the maximum amounts that these countries can qualify 
for. Even then, most countries diverged from what the EU budget had envisaged.  
Table 4: EU Budget 2004 Spending in the New Member States: Plan versus Reality  
(EUR millions) 














































































































































































































Source: European Commission (2005) and author’s calculations. 
 
As Table 4 illustrates, the total expected budget for 2004 was not fulfilled, as the new member 
states qualified for less than €6bn, while the appropriations were €6.2bn. The biggest 
“underachiever” was Hungary, which qualified for only €700m instead of the expected €825m 
(85%). In absolute terms, Poland lost some €154m. On the other hand, Lithuania could, if all 
programmes get approval, spend almost €480m, some €57m or 13% more than it was supposed to. The EU Budget Dispute – A Blessing in Disguise?   13 
 
The Czech Republic, Cyprus, Latvia and Malta all came very close to the originally planned sums. 
The following figure illustrates the individual countries’ standings vis-à-vis the Copenhagen plan. 




















































































Looking at the structure of the transfers, the new member states received two basic categories of 
budgetary transfers from the EU budget in 2004. Roughly one half of the total transfers – €2.7bn, 
i.e. 48% of the total – financed structural operations, agricultural transfers and internal policies 
(such as research and development, consumer protection, etc.). Although the economic ratios for 
these policies vary widely, they are all a constant fixture in the EU budget and will continue, 
perhaps in some disguise, in the next budgetary period 2007–2013 – see chapter  IV for a 
discussion. The remaining €3.2bn was transferred to the new members through two specific 
instruments – Pre-Accession Aid and Compensation for New Member States. These programmes 
either have been phased out already, or will diminish quickly (compensation is to fall from €1.2bn 
in 2004 to €900m in 2006).  
Therefore, one may argue that the former group of budgetary transfers is more important, as it 
better reflects the country’s ability to draw money through regular processes and this ability will 
be crucial if the country is to improve its budgetary position vis-à-vis the EU budget. The 
following two figures thus show the “success rate” of the new member countries in the two 
expenditure categories. It is interesting that only Lithuania was able to fill its “quota” of the 
“structural funds”. Other countries typically qualified for 95% of the allocated sum; only Slovenia 
and Cyprus managed just 90% of the allocated resources. As far as compensation is concerned, 
only Poland and Hungary did not qualify for the whole amount. Lithuania, on the other hand, may 
receive €60m more than was planned – a hefty bonus of 37%. 14   Ondřej Schneider  
 
Figure 3a: “Structural” Transfers from EU 
Budget as Percentage of 
Copenhagen Plan 
Figure 3b: “Compensation” Transfers from EU 





































































































































































Last but not least, we look at the spending items on which the EU budget money was used. As we 
show in chapter V, not all expenditures support economic growth. Some expenditure may, in fact, 
undermine long-term growth by, for example, encouraging interest groups to capture part of 
government spending. Therefore, we divide expenditures into two categories: productive and 
unproductive. While the division is arbitrary, we believe it captures the most important features of 
spending. Kneller, Bleany and Gemmel (1999) made a similar distinction in their paper, where 
they classified expenditures with a “substantial capital content” as productive.
14 Ederveen et al. 
(2002) argue that EU budget transfers may play another role than promoting economic efficiency 
(enhancing cultural or environmental values, for example), but this view has an obvious 
deficiency in its vagueness.  
Therefore, we classify the following spending programmes as “productive”: all structural 
operations, i.e. including the Cohesion Fund, which may be questionable. The Cohesion Fund 
plays a significant role in the three Mediterranean countries: Spain, Portugal and Greece, where 
the Cohesion Fund accounted for 0.2–0.25% of GDP in 2004. Furthermore, from among the 
Internal Policies, we classify spending on training and research and development as “productive”.  
Among the 25 EU members, Portugal seems to be the record breaker, as it spends 80% of EU 
budget transfers on “productive” programmes. Among the “old” EU-15, Luxembourg receives 
only 5% of total transfers in productive ways. However, Luxembourg is very special, as a full 
90% of its transfers come in administrative expenses. Among the more typical members, Austria 
and Belgium receive only about 20% of transfers in the productive category – see table 5. 
                                                           
14 They classified spending on public services, defence, education, health, housing and transport as productive. 
The paper, though, concentrated on national budgets within the OECD countries.  The EU Budget Dispute – A Blessing in Disguise?   15 
 
Table 5: Spending from the EU Budget, selected categories (% of GNI) 
  Agriculture Structural 
Funds 
Internal Policies  TOTAL  Total 
Productive 
Belgium 0.38%  0.12%  0.26%  1.72%  0.31% 
Czech Republic  0.11% 0.20% 0.04% 1.01%  0.22% 
Denmark 0.62%  0.10%  0.07%  0.81%  0.15% 
Germany 0.29%  0.21%  0.04%  0.55%  0.25% 
Estonia 0.20%  0.46%  0.43%  2.51%  0.56% 
Greece 1.70%  1.72% 0.11% 3.54%  1.81% 
Spain 0.81%  1.22%  0.03%  2.07%  1.25% 
France 0.57%  0.15%  0.05%  0.79%  0.19% 
Ireland 1.51%  0.68%  0.07%  2.29%  0.73% 
Italy 0.38%  0.34%  0.06%  0.79%  0.38% 
Cyprus 0.06%  0.04%  0.10%  1.22%  0.12% 
Latvia 0.30%  0.60%  0.34%  2.46%  0.68% 
Lithuania 0.28%  0.54%  0.66%  2.79%  0.60% 
Luxembourg 0.17%  0.13%  0.31%  4.79%  0.26% 
Hungary 0.08%  0.27%  0.12%  0.95%  0.31% 
Malta 0.06%  0.15%  0.09%  1.77%  0.23% 
Netherlands 0.29% 0.08% 0.09% 0.47%  0.15% 
Austria 0.49%  0.14%  0.06%  0.70%  0.18% 
Poland 0.16%  0.44%  0.09%  1.42%  0.48% 
Portugal 0.63%  2.63%  0.07%  3.34%  2.68% 
Slovenia 0.19%  0.09%  0.22%  1.08%  0.14% 
Slovakia 0.12%  0.35%  0.09%  1.15%  0.38% 
Finland 0.59%  0.24%  0.06%  0.91%  0.30% 
Sweden 0.31%  0.15%  0.05%  0.52%  0.20% 
UK 0.24%  0.13%  0.03%  0.41%  0.16% 
EU 0.42%  0.34%  0.05%  0.89% 0.38% 
Source: Allocation of EU Expenditure by Member State, European Commission (2005). 
 
The share of productive investment differs widely among the new member states. The highest 
share – one third – is recorded for Poland, Slovakia and Hungary. On the other hand, Cyprus, 
Malta and Slovenia spend only about 10% of total EU budget transfers on “productive” 
investments. On average, the new member states tend to spend less on productive investments – 
only 23% of total EU budget transfers – than the “old” members.  
We may thus conclude that the new member states failed to use the EU budget appropriations 
fully, but the result is not homogeneous for all countries. Estonia and Lithuania received the most, 
mainly due to their success in attracting “compensation” payments from the EU budget. On the 
other hand, Hungary and Poland fared the worst, mostly due to their mediocre record in receiving 
“compensation payments”. The new member states underperformed the old members also in the 
productive investment ratio, as most of the transfers were geared either towards agricultural 
subsidies or towards unspecified “compensation” schemes.  16   Ondřej Schneider  
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Source: Author. 
4. The New Financial Perspective for 2007–2013  
Although the last financial perspective has still not run its course, the negotiations for the next 
perspective for 2007–2013 have begun in earnest. The European Commission announced its 
proposal, which met with resistance from some EU countries and was rejected by the EU summit 
in Luxembourg in June 2005. The negotiations have been complicated by the recent enlargement, 
which has increased the number of countries and also the number of compromises and potential 
horse-trading required to reach a deal. The main contentious issues have been the size of the 
budget (1% or 1.24% of EU GDP), the restructuring of the budget so as to give more support to 
the EU’s main economic policy package – the Lisbon agenda, the treatment of the new member 
states, and the future of the United Kingdom rebate. In December 2005, an amended financial 
perspective was approved by the European Council, which fixed total spending (commitments) in 
2007–2013 at €862bn (1.045% of EU GDP). The deal cuts €160bn from the original Commission 
proposal, with the cuts (ironically) concentrated in the first heading of the budget, i.e. the 
“sustainable growth” chapter (where a massive €90bn was shaved from the EC’s budget 
proposal). We will discuss these issues in this chapter. 
The size of the budget 
As we noted in the previous chapter, the EU budget accounts for a small share of public 
expenditures across the EU. While average public expenditures in the EU were 48% of GDP in 
2003
15, the EU’s central budget hovers around 1% of total EU GDP.
16 Indeed, it fell from 1.05% 
of GDP in 1992 to 0.98% in 2003. Nevertheless, the budget is criticised as “a historical relic … 
inconsistent with the present and future state of EU integration” – see the Sapir report, p. 162. The 
criticism, briefly sketched in the previous chapter, stems from the very nature of the EU budget, 
which has not been built as a tool to improve the EU’s competitiveness or to increase its growth 
through spending on EU-wide public goods. The budget has been used rather as a political tool for 
                                                           
15 See European Commission (2004b). 
16 Indeed, the Sapir report argues that the national budgets, which account for 97.5% of public spending within 
the EU, need reform as urgently as the EU budget. The EU Budget Dispute – A Blessing in Disguise?   17 
 
compensating countries that were either damaged by certain EU policies or feared that they may 
be damaged.  
The Sapir report goes on to argue that the EU budget is a means of redistributing funds from one 
group of citizens to another. As such, it often degenerates to a zero-sum game in which individual 
countries compete to divert as much of the budget as possible to their own benefit, disregarding 
the EU-wide benefits. This is confirmed by our growth analysis in chapter V below, which shows 
a negligible impact of the EU budget on EU-wide economic growth. 
In December 2003, a group of six net contributors to the EU budget (Austria, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK) attacked the EC’s initial proposal and called for a ceiling of 
1% of GNI over the whole 2007–2013 period. The European Commission’s spring 2005 proposal 
ignored this requirement. Its official proposal – see European Commission (2004) – envisaged 
appropriations for commitments at 1.24% of GNI throughout the 2007–2013 period. The EC 
wanted the payments to rise gradually from 1.09% of GNI in 2006 to 1.15% in 2007 and 1.23% in 
2008. Only then should the payments fall again – to 1.15% of GNI in 2013. The Commission 
defended its position in a short memo in May 2005:  “Why 1% is not enough”, in which the EC 
outlined the inconsistency in the position of the “Six”. While France is adamantly against any 
change in agricultural expenditure, the UK refuses even to contemplate changing its rebate. Thus, 
while both countries may be urging for budgetary constraint, they are opposed to the most 
appealing cuts in EU budget expenditures.
17  
Figure 5a: Net Contributions to the Budget, 
2003 (EUR millions) 
Figure 5b: Net Contributions to the Budget, 
2003 (% of GNI) 
 
Source: Future Financing of the European Union – Report with Evidence, House of Lords, European 
Union Committee (2005). 
 
 
                                                           
17 Probably as a face-saving gesture, the EC proposed to cut about €50bn from the accumulated budget in 2007–
2013, i.e. about 5% of the budget – see Financial Times, May 19, 2005. As it happens, the cuts should be 
concentrated in research and development, the very area that the EC was promoting as the flagship of its 2007–
2013 budget proposal. 18   Ondřej Schneider  
 
The structure of the framework 2007–2013 
The financial framework proposal submitted by the European Commission to the June 2005 
Luxembourg summit was rejected at the summit. The falling-out was apparently driven by a long-
standing British–French conflict over the two most contentious EU budget items: the CAP and the 
UK rebate. Nevertheless, these feuds were present during the previous budget negotiations and 
eventually gave way to a compromise. Indeed, the December 2005 summit reached a compromise 
whereby the EU budget was set at 1.045% of the EU’s GNI level. The financial perspective was 
then little changed in a deal made between the European Parliament, Commission and Council in 
June 2006. The winners of the negotiations were France and the CAP. While the 
“competitiveness” budget was cut by a massive €59bn (over the 2007–2013 period) and the 
cohesion funds by a further €30bn, agricultural spending barely budged, falling by €8bn – see 
table 6 below.  
The Commission nevertheless managed to defend its reshuffling of the EU budget, or rather of its 
headings, which was inspired by the Lisbon agenda’s ambitious goal of creating “the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable 
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” by 2010.
18 While the 
Lisbon agenda has been quietly buried, the EU budget proposal does take inspiration from it and 
from subsequent reports looking at the reasons why the Lisbon agenda is faltering. The most 
prominent of these reports, the “Sapir” report, proposed that the budget should be radically 
reorganised into three funds: for growth, for convergence and for restructuring. This should, 
according to the report, allow the budget to play a more transparent role.  
The Commission was clearly inspired by the Sapir report, but it was also bound by the existing 
policies and their budgetary consequences. Thus, the Commission in its proposal outlined three 
main “policy objectives” for the budget: 
•  Sustainable development which encompasses: 
o  Competitiveness for growth and employment, 
o  Cohesion for growth and employment, and 
o  Preservation and management of natural resources. 
•  European citizenship consisting of: 
o  Freedom, security and justice and 
o  Access to basic public goods 
•  The EU as a global partner – promoting its core values. 
The re-juggled budget abolished the current structural funds and merged them into the sustainable 
development objective. The current CAP has been moved to “natural resources management”. 
The Commission’s original proposal envisaged agricultural spending falling from 42% of the EU 
budget in 2004 to 26% in 2013. However, the amended budget proposal envisages the share of 
agriculture being 34% in 2013. Moreover, further funds will be allocated to agriculture through 
the rural development facility.  
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Table 6: Financial Framework for 2007–2013, versions from June and December 2005  
(2005 prices, EUR millions)  
  Version  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013  Total/ 
Average 
June  2005  58,735 61,875 64,895 67,350 67,795 72,865 75,950  471,465 




June 2006  51,267  52,415  53,616  54,294  55,368  56,876  58,303  382,139 
June  2005  12,105 14,390 16,680 18,965 21,250 23,540 25,825  132,755 






June 2006  8,404  9,097  9,754  10,434  11,295  12,153  12,961  74,098 
June  2005  46,630 47,485 48,215 48,385 48,545 49,325 50,125  338,710 






June 2006  42,863  43,318  43,862  43,860  44,073  44,723  45,342  308,041 
June  2005  57,180 57,900 58,115 57,980 57,850 57,825 57,805  404,655 




Res.  June 2006  54,985  54,322  53,666  53,035  52,400  51,775  51,161  371,344 
June  2005  43,500 43,673 43,354 43,034 42,714 42,506 42,293  301,074 
Dec 2005  43,120  42,697  42,279  41,864  41,453  41,047  40,645  293,105 
Of which: 
Agriculture 
June 2006  43,120  42,697  42,279  41,864  41,453  41,047  40,645  293,105 
June  2005  2,570 2,935 3,235 3,530 3,835 4,145 4,455  24,705 
Dec 2005  1,120  1,210  1,310  1,430  1,570  1,720  1,910  10,270 
3. 
Citizenship 
June 2006  1,199  1,258  1,380  1,503  1,645  1,797  1,988  10,770 
June  2005  11,280 12,115 12,885 13,720 14,495 15,115 15,740 95,350 
Dec 2005  6,280  6,550  6,830  7,120  7,420  7,740  8,070  50,010 
4. Global 
player 
June 2006  6,199  6,469  6,739  7,009  7,339  7,679  8,029  49,463 
June  2005  3,675 3,815 3,950 4,090 4,225 4,365 4,500  28,620 
Dec 2005  6,720  6,900  7,050  7,180  7,320  7,450  7,680  50,300 
5. Admini-
stration 
June 2006  6,633  6,818  6,973  7,111  7,255  7,400  7,610  48,800 
June  2005  0,120  0,060  0,060  0 0 0 0 0,240 
Dec 2005  0,419  0,191  0,190  0  0  0  0  0,800 
6. Compen-
sation 
June 2006  0,419  0,191  0,190  0  0  0  0  0,800 
June  2005  133,560 138,700 143,140 146,670 150,200 154,315 158,450 1,025,035 




June 2006  120,702  121,473  122,564  122,952  124,007  125,527  127,091  864,316 
June  2005  1,15% 1,23% 1,12% 1,08% 1,11% 1,14% 1,15%  1,15% 
Dec 2005  1,10%  1,08%  1,06%  1,04%  1,03%  1,02%  1,00%  1,05% 
TOTAL in 
% of GNI 
June 2006  1,10%  1,08%  1,07%  1,04%  1,03%  1,02%  1,01%  1,05% 
TOTAL  June  2005  124,600 136,500 127,700 126,000 132,400 138,400 143,100 928,700 20   Ondřej Schneider  
 
Dec 2005  116,650  119,535  111,830  118,080  115,595  119,070  118,620  819,380  Payments 
June 2006  116,650  119,620  111,990  118,280  115,860  119,410  118,970  820,780 
June  2005  1.07% 1.21% 1.00% 0.93% 0.98% 1.02% 1.04%  1.04% 
Dec 2005  1.06%  1.06%  0.97%  1.00%  0.96%  0.97%  0.94%  0.99% 
TOTAL in 
% of GNI 
June 2006  1.06%  1.06%  0.97%  1.00%  0.96%  0.97%  0.94%  1.00% 
Source: Towards a New Financial  Perspective 2007–2013, European Commission, June 2005, 
Council of the European Union, document 15915/05, December 2005, 
Interinstitutional Agreement between the EP, the Council and the Commission on budgetary 
discipline and sound fiscal management 2006/C139/01, 23 June 2006 (available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/prior_future/next_fin_framework_en.htm). 
A. Competitiveness for growth and employment 
This first objective is inspired by the Sapir report and aims at promoting economic growth. This 
being Europe, though, growth is couched with cohesion considerations and the result is a mixture 
of hardly compatible policies. 
The Commission argues that the main objectives within this objective (sic) are:   
a) promoting competitiveness in fully integrated internal markets, b) strengthening European 
research and technological development, c) connecting the EU through networks, d) improving 
the quality of education and training, and e) helping European society to manage change with 
social policy. While these are rather vague principles, two aspects stand out. First, the 
Commission advocates full integration of EU markets, i.e. including the so-far fragmented service 
sector. Second, the Commission supports the Lisbon agenda’s goal of 3% of GDP expenditure on 
research and development by boosting its expenditure on this agenda.
19 However, the December 
2005 negotiations cut an awesome €90bn from this objective, the greatest cut among all the 
objectives in absolute terms. 
Two reservations vis-à-vis the EU increasing its role in financing research may arise. First, it is far 
from clear that the EU budget is more efficient than national budgets in financing R&D. The 
Commission proposes to increase its R&D expenditure significantly but does not provide much on 
its implementation strategy. The social policy agenda is even more contentious. The Commission 
claims that its spending may reduce health and safety risks, increase the number of EU citizens 
benefiting from social security coordination, increase the number of employed people and 
promote social dialogue. Whether €13bn is good value for money remains an open question.  
B. Cohesion for growth and employment 
The Commission proposal brings one fundamental change from the previous financial framework: 
the cohesion policy changes from being a time-limited and geographically focused policy to a 
permanent policy pursuing “balanced territorial development”. This was strongly opposed by the 
new member states, but also by the UK and Sweden, who argued that cohesion funds should be 
                                                           
19 It is thus surprising to see the EC proposing to cut about €50bn from research and development spending, as 
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allocated exclusively to the poorest member states and should not be allocated on a regional level 
(NUTS2).  
The Commission nevertheless proposed and defended three main objectives within this objective: 
a) convergence with a focus on the less developed member states and regions, including 
“statistical effect regions”, b) regional competitiveness and employment, and c) European 
territorial cooperation.  
Taken together, the Cohesion policy accounts for €308bn in the 2007–2013 period, i.e. 36% of the 
total budget. The largest part would go to the convergence objective, to which all regions with 
income below 75% of the EU average, “statistical effect regions” and countries with income 
below 90% of the EU average would be entitled. This generous interpretation of the convergence 
needs is driven by the Commission’s desire to guarantee approval from countries that benefited 
from the structural funds in the “old” EU-15 and now risk losing this entitlement. Further, in the 
second objective – regional competitiveness – the Commission wants all regions within the EU to 
become eligible, including the richest ones. The last objective – territorial cooperation – would 
consume only 4% of this objective’s budget, i.e. €14bn. As a gesture towards the new member 
states, the Commission would cut the co-financing requirement – which is very sensitive for the 
new member states – from 25% to 15%, i.e. making projects more affordable for these countries. 
At the same time, this cut weakens the in-built disciplinary effects of co-financing. 
The structural funds have been traditionally fought over along national lines, as no country wants 
to lose its entitlements. As indicated above, the recent enlargement has made the competition for 
funds much fiercer and some “old members” have utilised their incumbent position. Indeed, the 
Commission estimates that about 50% of the total funding will go to the EU-15 in the 2007–2013 
period, the remaining half being directed at the ten new members from 2004 and Bulgaria and 
Romania.  
C. Preservation and management of natural resources 
This is the second largest spending programme in the new financial perspective, accounting for 
almost 40% of the total budget, i.e. €404bn. It gets only limited exposure in the Commission 
budget proposal, as it is based on a pre-emptive agreement of the European Council in 2002. The 
budget proposal does not provide any details as to how the CAP expenditures will be split 
between production-related payments and direct income subsidies.  
Four fifths of this objective is earmarked for CAP expenditures, 20% goes to rural development 
programmes and the remaining funds are allocated for fishery and, finally, environment 
purposes.
20  
The biggest item, CAP payments, is expected to grow by 1% annually in nominal terms, thus 
precipitating a slow decline in these payments in real terms and also as a share of the EU budget. 
However, the CAP continues to fail the test of efficiency. The EU budget is supporting a declining 
and economically hardly significant sector with no evident EU-wide economies of scale.
21 Given 
                                                           
20 Most environmental programmes are to be financed from the cohesion policy or external relations objective. 
21 The CAP is also the main reason for the UK rebate. As the rebate becomes more and more challenged, it 
exposes the skewed nature of the CAP as well. 22   Ondřej Schneider  
 
the widely different preferences for agricultural sector support among member countries, re-
allocation of the CAP to the national level would certainly be welfare improving. As the CAP 
gives more importance to direct income support, this heterogeneity becomes ever more visible. 
Subsidising farmers across the EU with the same income subsidy evidently does not make sense, 
as evidenced by the current lowered level of subsidies to the new member states 
D. European citizenship 
This is the smallest objective in budgetary terms, accounting for €10bn, or a mere 1% of the total 
budget. Moreover, during the final negotiations in December 2005, this objective’s budget was cut 
by more than 50% (from the originally envisaged €24bn). Besides internal security policies 
(border protection, common asylum and immigration policy) the objective also contains the 
cryptic “access to basic goods and services” (accounting for 20% of this objective’s budget). This 
represents an extension of the EU’s policies, as currently no goods and services are provided by 
the EU. The budget waxes on about vague policies to “reinforce safety and security standards to 
achieve clean energy and transport systems”, or ensuring “safety of goods” but provides little 
guidance on how the money would actually be spent and why this should be an EU policy at all. 
E. The EU as a global partner 
The last objective accounts for €50bn over the 2007–2013 period, or 5% of the total budget. It is 
aimed at increasing the EU’s role as a major global player. The Commission proposes to spend 
roughly half of this heading’s budget on the EU’s neighbourhood policy, which encompasses such 
differentiated regions as Russia, the Balkans, the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. The 
remaining half is to be spent on “sustainable development”, mainly cooperation with developing 
countries focused on eradication of poverty via the Millennium Development Goals. As world 
development remains high on the agenda of the EU governments and the common EU activities 
are regarded positively both by the public and by politicians, there is little resistance to this last 
objective. However, quantification of the benefits that this objective yields is impossible.  
Own resources and EU tax 
The new financial perspective for 2007–2013 also presents an opportunity to analyse the revenue 
side of the EU budget. The Commission argues that one way to increase the transparency of the 
EU budget is to introduce a visible tax resource payable by EU subjects. The Commission names 
three possibilities: corporate tax, VAT tax and energy tax. Each of these three taxes would have 
different country-specific effects and would face stiff opposition from countries in danger of 
losing more than proportionally from its introduction.  
A new “EU tax” would shift the system from relying mainly on government contributions 
(through the now dominant GNI-based resource) to financing by citizens and/or  firms within the 
EU. While this shift might be preferred from the point of view of administrative transparency and 
might be also more convenient for the Commission, it is not evident that it would be more “fair” 
or “transparent” to European taxpayers and it would certainly not increase the EU’s popularity. The EU Budget Dispute – A Blessing in Disguise?   23 
 




The last, but perhaps most flammable, issue introduced in the Commission’s new financial 
perspective proposal, is the future of the UK rebate. The rebate, introduced in 1984, “corrects” the 
UK’s excessive net contribution to the EU budget caused by low transfers to the British 
agricultural sector. Without the rebate, the UK would be the biggest net contributor to the EU 
budget in absolute terms. The rebate in 2003 totalled almost €5bn. As the rebate costs have 
increased, four net contributors to the EU budget (Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and 
Sweden) have paid only 25% of their ex-ante share of the UK rebate since 2002; the remaining 
share of the cost of the UK rebate is financed by other member states, mainly France, Italy and 
Spain. 
Table 7: Estimated Net Budgetary Balances, Average 2008–2013 (% of GNI) 
  No correction  UK rebate  EC proposal 
Luxembourg 5.89%  5.80%  5.83% 
Latvia 4.51%  4.40%  4.45% 
Lithuania 4.50%  4.41%  4.44% 
Estonia 3.85%  3.76%  3.79% 
Poland 3.85%  3.76%  3.79% 
Slovakia 3.36%  3.27%  3.30% 
Czech Republic  3.26%  3.17%  3.20% 
Hungary 3.15%  3.06%  3.09% 
Greece 2.25%  2.16%  2.19% 
Portugal 1.60%  1.50%  1.54% 
Slovenia 1.40%  1.31%  1.34% 
Belgium 1.32%  1.21%  1.27% 
Malta 1.16%  1.06%  1.10% 
Ireland 0.56%  0.47%  0.51% 
Spain 0.32%  0.23%  0.26% 
Finland -0.14%  -0.25%  -0.20% 
Denmark -0.20%  -0.31%  -0.26% 
France -0.27%  -0.37%  -0.33% 
Cyprus -0.28%  -0.37%  -0.33% 
Italy -0.29%  -0.41%  -0.35% 
Austria -0.37%  -0.38%  -0.41% 
Sweden -0.47%  -0.50%  -0.45% 
Germany -0.52%  -0.54%  -0.48% 
Netherlands -0.55%  -0.56%  -0.48% 
UK -0.62%  -0.25%  -0.51% 
Source: European Commission (2004d). 
The Commission proposed to introduce a “generalised correction mechanism” that would 
compensate countries whose net contributions exceed a certain threshold as a percentage of GNI. 
Above the threshold, the country would pay contributions to the EU budget at a reduced rate. The 
Commission claimed that this would both correct the budgetary burden for net payers and 
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maintain solidarity within the EU. As an illustrative example, the Commission estimated the 
budgetary impact of the generalised correction mechanism with the threshold for net contributions 
at 0.35% of GNI and then a rebate of 66% on contributions above the threshold. Moreover, the net 
contributions would be capped at €7.5bn for each country. Evidently, the cap expressed in 
absolute terms favours large countries, and as table 7 suggests, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy 
and Sweden would benefit most from the change. 
In December 2005, the UK proposed to cut its rebate by €10bn (about 20% of the total) as a way 
to “pay” for the enlargement. While this allowed the 2007–2013 budget to get through, the 
discussion of a more stable budgetary correction mechanism was shelved. 
5. The EU Budget and Potencial Economic Growth 
In this chapter we will discuss the impact of the EU budget on the potential growth performance 
of the European countries. For that purpose, we will use a simple overlapping generations growth 
model, applied by Tanzi and Chalk in Buti et al. (2002) and inspired by Barro (1991) and 
Mendoza (1997). We will then apply the model results to the EU budget data to assess the 
budget’s contribution to economic growth in individual countries and in the whole EU. We should 
stress that this exercise ignores the short-term demand effects of EU budget transfers, no matter 
how strong they might be. While we follow a rather standard classification (see, for example, 
Kneller, Bleany and Gemmel, 1999), our analysis makes an unavoidably normative decision as to 
which expenditures (may) contribute to economic growth. Finally, we concentrate on long-term 
effects, as they will shape each country’s performance for years to come. Also, our analysis treats 
transfers from national budgets to the EU budget as “new” spending that requires increased taxes. 
As governments successfully reclaim most of this money, they may not see it necessarily as a new 
spending programme.  
While the Tanzi and Chalk model is very simple, its conclusions were supported by a more 
sophisticated analysis by Ederveen, de Groot and Nahuis (2002), who empirically explored the 
effectiveness of the European budget using a panel data analysis for 13 countries in the European 
Union. They show that the structural funds are weakly effective for countries with the proper 
institutional framework. The latter result is obtained for a wide range of conditioning variables, 
such as openness, institutional quality, corruption and indicators for good governance. Where 
institutions are underdeveloped, the structural funds either do not influence economic growth or 
may even hamper it (see Ederveen et al., 2002, for a discussion). Our model complements 
previous models by adding the (negative) impact of taxes used for raising necessary funds. 
The model 
The model uses a classical production function with capital and labour, where capital comes in 
two forms: private Kt and public KG,t. The production function has constant returns to scale with 
respect to the stock of public and private capital, but increasing returns to scale overall.  
1
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Households maximise their lifetime utility and every worker supplies one unit of labour every 
period. In order to make model as simple as possible, we assume that the labour supply does not 
depend on taxes and that the saving rate is not influenced by the interest rate.  
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Consumption in the future depends on savings Zt and the rate of return Rt. Optimal savings Zt 
finance both private and public investment in the next period. 
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The government finances its budget by levying a uniform tax rate t on all income from capital and 
labour. It then spends the entire budget on new capital Gt and on servicing debt Bt: 
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G δ  is the depreciation rate for public capital (we assume a zero depreciation rate for 
private capital Kt). 
Firms maximise profit: 
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As we assume perfect capital markets, in every period savings equal investment: 
1 1 ) 1 ( + + + = − = t t t t t K B Y t s L z β   (7) 
And private capital grows with total savings and falls with increasing government debt Bt and 
increasing taxes. So we may formulate a “crowding-out equation” (8): 
1 1 ) 1 ( + + − − = t t t B Y t s K β  
(8) 
Finally, we derive the growth equation. Growth could be disaggregated into the three factors’ 





































Substituting for private and public capital from equations (4) and (8) allows us to express the 










































Equation (10) allows us to disentangle the effects of government fiscal policy on economic 
growth. While increasing public capital KG,t increases economic growth, its financing growth 
decreases, either through the tax effect or through the debt effect. The debt effect is 
straightforward: the higher the debt B, the lower the growth. The tax effect has two channels: first, 
taxes lower growth. But at the same time, the higher taxes allow a decrease in debt, i.e. they may 
encourage growth. However, the former tax effect is of a stronger magnitude and dominates the 
effect of (possibly) lower debt. The total effect of government policy depends on parameters α 
and β. 
The growth effect 
The Tanzi and Chalk model can be estimated and these estimates may be used in calculations of 
the total potential growth effect. Tanzi and Chalk estimated that debt lowers growth by a factor of 
0.02, direct taxes lower growth by a factor of 0.08 and public investment boosts growth by a 
factor of 0.25. Nevertheless, these elasticities at least provide us with some crude estimates of the 
EU budget’s effect on the EU-wide economy. Kneller, Bleany and Gemmel (1999) estimated that 
“distortionary taxes”
23 cut growth by a factor of 0.44, while non-distortionary taxes
24 made no 
impact. According to Kneller et al., productive investment increases growth by a factor of 0.27 i.e. 
very similarly as in the Tanzi-Chalk specification.  
To assess the growth impact of the EU budget we used the European Commission analysis of 
allocation of expenditures and revenues by member state (European Commission, 2005). This 
allows us to distribute among all 25 EU member states. The following table summarises the 
payments of individual countries to the EU budget. 
The most important is the TOTAL column, which shows the total contributions of individual 
countries from various distorting tax sources. The table illustrates that the highest share of 
national income (and thus the highest distortion) is borne by Belgium, which pays 1.34% of its 
GNI to the budget. The lowest burden falls on the UK, due to its rebate. The ten new member 
states of the EU were members for only 8 months, so their contributions are proportionally lower. 
                                                           
23 Defined in their paper as taxes on income and profit, social security contributions and taxes on property.  
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Three out of the four countries that are almost completely excluded from UK rebate financing – 
Germany, Austria and Sweden – fare relatively well, too.
25 
















Source: European Commission (2005). 
The following table 9 shows the allocation of expenditures by member state for various 
expenditure categories. In order to assess their impact on economic growth, we have to 
disentangle these categories into those that can be attributed to capital accumulation – productive 
investment – and those that serve other purposes, mostly redistributive. As argued above, we 
classified structural operations, spending on training and spending on research and development 
as “productive”. While education and training clearly do not contribute to physical capital, it can 
be argued that they increase human capital and thus increase economic growth.
26 
                                                           
25 The fourth – the Netherlands – has its contributions boosted by the high customs duties that are collected in its 
ports, even though the costs are borne by customers, mostly in Germany. 














Belgium  0.44% 0.12% 0.69% 0.09% 1.34% 
Czech Rep.  0.07% 0.10% 0.46% 0.06% 0.69% 
Denmark  0.13% 0.11% 0.68% 0.08% 1.00% 
Germany  0.11% 0.12% 0.68% 0.02% 0.93% 
Estonia  0.09% 0.09% 0.44% 0.06% 0.68% 
Greece  0.12% 0.15% 0.70% 0.09% 1.06% 
Spain  0.12% 0.15% 0.70% 0.09% 1.06% 
France  0.07% 0.14% 0.68% 0.09% 0.98% 
Ireland  0.10% 0.15% 0.68% 0.09% 1.02% 
Italy  0.09% 0.15% 0.69% 0.09% 1.02% 
Cyprus  0.16% 0.10% 0.47% 0.06% 0.79% 
Latvia  0.07% 0.08% 0.41% 0.06% 0.62% 
Lithuania  0.08% 0.09% 0.45% 0.06% 0.68% 
Luxembourg  0.06% 0.16% 0.72% 0.09% 1.03% 
Hungary  0.07% 0.10% 0.47% 0.06% 0.70% 
Malta  0.12% 0.10% 0.47% 0.06% 0.75% 
Netherlands  0.30% 0.14% 0.69% 0.01% 1.14% 
Austria  0.08% 0.11% 0.70% 0.01% 0.90% 
Poland  0.06% 0.10% 0.68% 0.09% 0.93% 
Portugal  0.09% 0.14% 0.69% 0.09% 1.01% 
Slovenia  0.05% 0.10% 0.45% 0.06% 0.66% 
Slovakia  0.06% 0.09% 0.46% 0.06% 0.67% 
Finland  0.06% 0.14% 0.68% 0.09% 0.97% 
Sweden  0.11% 0.13% 0.70% 0.01% 0.95% 
UK  0.13% 0.15% 0.69% -0.30% 0.67% 
EU  0.12% 0.14% 0.68% 0.00% 0.94%  




























Belgium 0.14% 0.17% 0.01% 0.02% 0.04% 0.38% 0.12% 0.00% 0.00% 0.12% 0.04% 0.01% 0.04% 0.15% 0.02% 0.26% 1.72%
Czech Rep. 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.11% 0.00% 0.11% 0.20% 0.00% 0.00% 0.20% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.04% 1.01%
Denmark 0.44% 0.13% 0.00% 0.02% 0.03% 0.62% 0.10% 0.00% 0.00% 0.10% 0.01% 0.02% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% 0.07% 0.81%
Germany 0.21% 0.02% 0.01% 0.04% 0.01% 0.29% 0.21% 0.00% 0.00% 0.21% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00% 0.04% 0.55%
Estonia 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.19% 0.00% 0.20% 0.46% 0.00% 0.00% 0.46% 0.06% 0.01% 0.32% 0.04% 0.00% 0.43% 2.51%
Greece 1.15% 0.01% 0.01% 0.08% 0.45% 1.70% 1.51% 0.00% 0.21% 1.72% 0.03% 0.00% 0.01% 0.06% 0.01% 0.11% 3.54%
Spain 0.55% 0.02% 0.01% 0.07% 0.16% 0.81% 0.97% 0.00% 0.25% 1.22% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.03% 2.07%
France 0.44% 0.03% 0.00% 0.05% 0.05% 0.57% 0.15% 0.00% 0.00% 0.15% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.03% 0.00% 0.05% 0.79%
Ireland 0.90% 0.18% 0.03% 0.29% 0.11% 1.51% 0.66% 0.00% 0.02% 0.68% 0.03% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% 0.07% 2.29%
Italy 0.27% 0.01% 0.01% 0.05% 0.04% 0.38% 0.34% 0.00% 0.00% 0.34% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.03% 0.01% 0.06% 0.79%
Cyprus 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.06% 0.00% 0.06% 0.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.04% 0.04% 0.01% 0.01% 0.04% 0.00% 0.10% 1.22%
Latvia 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.30% 0.00% 0.30% 0.60% 0.00% 0.00% 0.60% 0.05% 0.01% 0.25% 0.03% 0.00% 0.34% 2.46%
Lithuania 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.28% 0.00% 0.28% 0.52% 0.00% 0.02% 0.54% 0.05% 0.27% 0.29% 0.01% 0.04% 0.66% 2.79%
Luxembourg 0.10% 0.00% 0.00% 0.07% 0.00% 0.17% 0.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% 0.06% 0.02% 0.15% 0.07% 0.01% 0.31% 4.79%
Hungary 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.08% 0.00% 0.08% 0.27% 0.00% 0.00% 0.27% 0.02% 0.00% 0.08% 0.02% 0.00% 0.12% 0.95%
Malta 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.06% 0.00% 0.06% 0.15% 0.00% 0.00% 0.15% 0.06% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.00% 0.09% 1.77%
Netherlands 0.09% 0.11% 0.00% 0.01% 0.08% 0.29% 0.08% 0.00% 0.00% 0.08% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.06% 0.01% 0.09% 0.47%
Austria 0.26% 0.02% 0.00% 0.20% 0.01% 0.49% 0.14% 0.00% 0.00% 0.14% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.03% 0.01% 0.06% 0.70%
Poland 0.00% 0.01% -0.01% 0.15% 0.01% 0.16% 0.44% 0.00% 0.00% 0.44% 0.02% 0.00% 0.05% 0.02% 0.00% 0.09% 1.42%
Portugal 0.36% 0.02% 0.00% 0.15% 0.10% 0.63% 2.39% 0.00% 0.24% 2.63% 0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 0.03% 0.01% 0.07% 3.34%
Slovenia 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.19% 0.00% 0.19% 0.09% 0.00% 0.00% 0.09% 0.02% 0.00% 0.17% 0.03% 0.00% 0.22% 1.08%
Slovakia 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.12% 0.00% 0.12% 0.35% 0.00% 0.00% 0.35% 0.02% 0.01% 0.05% 0.01% 0.00% 0.09% 1.15%
Finland 0.30% 0.06% 0.00% 0.22% 0.01% 0.59% 0.24% 0.00% 0.00% 0.24% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.05% 0.00% 0.06% 0.91%
Sweden 0.22% 0.02% 0.00% 0.06% 0.01% 0.31% 0.15% 0.00% 0.00% 0.15% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 0.04% 0.00% 0.05% 0.52%
UK 0.19% 0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.24% 0.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00% 0.03% 0.41%
EU 0.29% 0.03% 0.00% 0.05% 0.05% 0.42% 0.31% 0.00% 0.03% 0.34% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.03% 0.00% 0.05% 0.89%  
Source: European Commission (2005) and author’s calculations.  
 
The country that receives most of this “productive” investment in 2004 is Portugal (2.7% of its 
GNI), followed by Greece (1.8% of GDI) and Spain (1.3% of GNI). The three Baltic countries 
benefited most from among the new EU-10, but they still received only 0.5–0.6% of their GNI in 
productive investment. Other countries receive less than 1% of GNI, the lowest beneficiaries 
being Denmark, the Netherlands, Cyprus, Slovenia and the UK, which all receive only 0.1–0.2% 
of GNI in productive investment from the EU budget.  
We finally combine these two inputs – taxes paid and capital investments received – to calculate 
the total effect of the EU budget on economic growth in the EU-25. The results are summarised in 
figure 6. Five countries of the old EU-15 are estimated to gain a positive growth impulse from the 
EU budget: Portugal, Greece, Spain, Italy and Ireland. The remaining ten countries suffer a 
negative effect, ranging from a negligible number in Finland to a -0.06% effect for the 
Netherlands. Among the new EU-10, the three Baltic countries get a 0.1% boost due to EU budget 
transfers. Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Malta are in the neutral region: 
their performance is unchanged after the transfers. Slovenia and Cyprus may suffer a (very 
limited) setback to their growth rate. 
































































































































































































Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
It should be repeated here that these effects account for only the direct budgetary effects of the 
European Union. We do not take into account effects of higher competition from within the single 
market, neither do we account for macroeconomic policies on the EU level. On the other hand, 
our results should not be dismissed out of hand. The annual boost of 0.6% for the Portuguese 
economy adds 6% to the economy over a decade, a sizeable effect. Other “southern” countries – 
Greece and Spain and to an extent also Italy – also received a boost. 30   Ondřej Schneider  
 
However, if we take the European Union as a single entity, its growth potential is unaffected by 
its budget. The EU-25 countries paid in 2004 on average (GNI weighted) 0.9% of GNI in taxes to 
the budget. They received, on the other hand, 0.89% of GNI from the EU budget, but only 0.38% 
could have been classified as “productive investment” contributing to higher competitiveness of 
the EU economy (with all the caveats applied above). Thus, taken together, the EU budget may 
spur the EU’s growth by a statistically insignificant 0.023% a year. It is fair to argue that such a 
miniscule effect is negligible and that there is probably no EU-wide economic effect from the EU 
budget.  
One remark is due, however, in this context. If we applied the same methodology to any national 
budget of an EU member country, the effect would be much worse, as all countries devote a major 
part of their budgets to redistributive programmes that would not qualify as “productive” in the 
Tanzi and Chalk methodology. 
6. The New Member States’ Position  
This chapter deals with the potential impact of the new financial perspective for the period 2007–
2013 on the new member states (NMSs), and specifically on the Czech Republic. The NMSs are 
all certain to remain net beneficiaries of the budget, but they will have to compete for funds not 
only with the current objective 1 countries (Portugal, Greece, Spain), but with many other “phase-
in” and “phase-out” regions. As table 7 above shows, the biggest beneficiaries will be the three 
Baltic countries and Poland, which are expected to receive net transfers of around 4% GNI 
annually. Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic should benefit to the tune of 3% GNI 
annually, while Slovenia will receive the lowest transfers (between 1% and 2% of GNI). 
The crucial factor, however, is how the member countries use the funds transferred from the EU 
budget, i.e. whether they use them for “productive investment” in line with Tanzi and Chalk or 
whether they waste them by financing purely redistributive programmes. The old member 
countries differ to a large extent in their ability to channel EU funds towards more productive 
investment. By definition, countries receiving structural funds should enjoy higher productivity 
effects. Indeed, 80% of EU funds spent in Portugal can be classified as “productive”. This share, 
though, falls to 60% for Spain and even to 42% in another big recipient – Greece. As we 
illustrated, the new member states do not reach this high productivity level, as most of their 
transfers are “compensation” payments geared towards general budgets. Figure 7 shows that the 
new member states receive the bulk of their budgets from the compensation programmes. The EU Budget Dispute – A Blessing in Disguise?   31 
 



























































































Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
If we make the “reasonable” assumption that the NMSs, in the medium term, will not be as 
efficient as Portugal but they will increase their share of productive investment to some 50% of 
total EU transfers, they may expect a boost to their growth rate of some 0.5% for the Baltic 
countries and Poland, 0.4% for the three central European countries (Hungary, Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic) and 0.3% for Slovenia. 
The impact of European Union membership is not, however, limited to budgetary transfers. 
Especially for the new members, EU membership is supposed to accelerate their convergence to 
the higher income countries. As our estimates in the previous chapter suggest, EU membership 
(and the capital investment it brings) may increase a country’s growth rate. In this respect, it 
matters more whether the EU will complete the single market, improve its macroeconomic 
framework and boost investment in human capital than whether the new financial perspective will 
direct more or less capital investment to the NMSs. 
Nevertheless, the budget may support the NMSs’ convergence. In this respect, the new financial 
framework for 2007–2013 may play an important role in redirecting funds from non-productive 
programmes, such as the CAP, to more pro-growth agenda. The Commission set a very ambitious 
goal of increasing investment in research and development, which should reach €80bn over seven 
years. For this investment to be successful, however, a functioning system of EU-wide 
coordination must be set up in order to select the best projects and avoid duplications.  
The new member states face a challenging dilemma in this respect. As they are to gain most from 
the EU acceleration, they should be supporting the reallocation of funds to research and 
development. Also, their agricultural lobbies are less organised and less “corrupted” by the CAP, 
so elimination of some CAP subsidies would face less strong opposition. Thus, the NMSs should 
join countries such as the UK and the Netherlands and accelerate the CAP reduction in order to 
make room for more productive investment. 
On the other hand, the NMSs would most probably benefit less than proportionally from a 
reallocation. Their research and development capacities do not guarantee that they would qualify 
for a proportional part of the funds spent. Moreover, the NMSs tend to have proportionally larger 
agricultural sectors, so they stand to gain more from the (unreformed) CAP, once its most striking 32   Ondřej Schneider  
 
bias is eliminated. Thus, from this point of view, short-term budgetary logic should lead the 
NMSs to support France and the EU’s “Mediterranean wing”. 
The NMSs’ position on the UK rebate is much more straightforward: they stand to gain from the 
elimination of the UK rebate, even if it is substituted by the Commission’s proposal of a 
generalised correction mechanism – see table 8. Thus, if the EU leaders opted for a grand “zero”, 
i.e. joint elimination of the rebate and substantial reduction in CAP spending, the new member 
states should celebrate.  
The NMSs may protest against a more generous interpretation of the qualifying conditions for the 
new structural objectives. In fact, however, the NMSs stand to lose only marginally there. 
“Statistical effect regions” will qualify for only €22bn over the whole financial perspective, 2% of 
the entire budget. 
It may be interesting to look at the official budgetary flows in 2005, as recorded by the Czech 
government.
27 Czech central government received some CZK 22bn (1% of the Czech GDP), i.e. 
76% of the planned sum and slightly more than 3% of the total tax revenues of the Czech 
government. The Czech government transferred CZK 26bn, i.e. CZK 4bn more than it received. If 
other than central government budgets are included, the total impact of EU transfers is nil – CZK 
31bn went in and CZK 31bn went out. 
7. Conclusion 
The European Union finds itself in a fascinating period. The great push for more integration and 
enlargement in the 1990s has led to some fatigue within the EU. At the same time, the EU is 
underperforming in economic terms not only against the USA, but more importantly against the 
expectations of its own citizens. As a reaction, the EU has set out to streamline its governance and 
to re-focus towards growth-friendly activities. The Union’s financial framework for the 2007–
2013 period reflects these conflicts. On the one hand, all the member countries are obsessed with 
limiting their net contributions to the budget. On the other hand, no country seems to be prepared 
to give up its own pet projects on the spending agenda. Add to this ten newcomers trying to 
muscle their way to funds from the EU and the mixture becomes very combustible. 
Nevertheless, even in this flux, the EU authorities and their masters in the national governments 
should seek an economically efficient framework for the new financial perspective spanning the 
period 2007–2013. Both the European Commission proposal and the Lisbon agenda provide some 
useful guiding principles. First, the EU budget should limit its non-productive spending, mostly 
on the Common Agricultural Policy. The CAP has been nudged towards yet another redistributive 
policy that is better run at the national level. For example, the 2004–2006 co-financing of EU 
budget transfers to farmers in the new member states represents a first attempt at introducing a 
national co-financing mechanism into the CAP and should be extended.  
Second, the European budget may increase its convergence role by concentrating more on poor 
member states. In this respect, the dilution of the structural funds’ focus on poor member states, as 
                                                           
27 Czech finance ministry website: Report on the state budget in 2005 (in Czech 
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envisaged in the new financial perspective, is counterproductive. The EU should consider moving 
towards a more generalised model whereby richer countries would support poorer ones through a 
system of redistributive grants among countries. Such a generalised system would end the current 
anomaly where the two richest member states – Luxembourg and Ireland – are also the biggest net 
recipients of EU funds. 
Last, but perhaps not least, the EU may play useful catalytic role in financing some areas with 
potential economies of scale or high public good or externality effects. These may include 
research and development (including international training and education, where Erasmus is 
planned to take 40% of the education budget, i.e. €14bn) and infrastructure programmes.  
The Sapir report (2003) similarly argues that the budget should shift from agriculture to 
promoting economic growth by spending on research and development and education. The new 
member states may play a useful role in the EU budget negotiations if they help to bring about a 
substantial change in the budget. The EU budget as it is now represents a neutral factor for most 
countries and it will accelerate the new member states’ economies only marginally. Given the 
attention, effort and time given to the budget, it is not good value for their money. 
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